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Abstract
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory
predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence
has remained to be rather weak. In this work we performed laboratory experiments on the RPS game and analyzed the
social-state evolutionary trajectories of twelve populations of N = 6 players. We found strong evidence supporting the
existence of persistent cycles. The mean cycling frequency was measured to be 0.029±0.009 period per experimental
round. Our experimental observations can be quantitatively explained by a simple non-equilibrium model, namely the
discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise parameter. Our work therefore favors the evolutionary game theory
over the classical game theory for describing the dynamical behavior of the RPS game.
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is becoming a gen-
eral theoretical framework to analysis strategies behav-
iors [1, 2, 3]. EGT is rooted in the classical game the-
ory (CGT) [4] and the theory of evolution [5]. Different
from CGT, EGT predicts there could exist persistent cy-
cles in the evolutionary trajectories in the strategy space
[6, 7, 8].
As an example let us consider the standard Rock-
Paper-Scissors (RPS) game. This is a prototype game in
textbooks [1, 4, 6, 9, 7]. In this game, dynamics equa-
tions (e.g., the standard replicator dynamics equations)
in EGT predict that the evolutionary trajectory will cy-
cle around the Nash equilibrium persistently. However,
the CGT predicts full random behavior: the system is in
a mixed-strategy equilibrium with each cyclic motion
being balanced completely by its reverse cyclic motion.
According to the CGT theory, cycles (also referred to
as excess loops) cannot be observed in the evolutionary
trajectories in the long run [8, 10].
Empirical examples of the RPS cycles are constantly
being discovered in nature, e.g., three morphs male
∗Corresponding author. email: wangzj@zju.edu.cn
lizard [11] and others [12, 13]. The environment for
animal contests is decentralized, in which the encounter
is pairwise, but population strategy shows cyclic behav-
iors [1, 11]. In general, human economic behaviors
(e.g., exchanges) are also pairwise and not centralized
[14]. To test EGT in human game experiments [15],
the traditional setting is decentralized (see review [16]),
in which a subject in each round competes with one
random-pairwise opponent within a finite population
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In such traditional set-
ting experiment, whether the trajectories are persistent
cycles instead of convergence to a Nash equilibrium re-
mains an open question [16, 24, 10]. Till now, no persis-
tent cycle has been confirmed in the RPS experiment un-
der such a traditional setting [8, 10], and furthermore no
dynamics observation has been reported quantitatively.
In this paper we study the evolutionary trajectories
of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game from the perspec-
tive of non-equilibrium statistical physics. In non-
equilibrium statistical physics studies, formulating a
physically meaningful measure of the distance from
equilibrium is an area of active research [25]. An equi-
librium system satisfies the detailed balance condition,
which ensures the time reversal symmetry. However,
detailed balance is broken in a non-equilibrium system
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even in its stationary state, therefore various dynami-
cal patterns may show up in the evolutionary trajectory.
Several non-equilibrium order parameters, such as en-
tropy production [26, 27] and velocity [28], have been
constructed to characterize the distance from equilib-
rium. In this work we carry out laboratory experiments
on the RPS game, and we detect the possible existence
of persistent cyclic flows using an angular frequency as
the non-equilibrium order parameter. A non-zero an-
gular frequency serves as a quantitative measure of the
distance from equilibrium for the evolutionary trajecto-
ries. We also compare our experimental observations
with the predictions of a simple non-equilibrium model,
the discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise
parameter β.
Our experiments are the standard RPS games with the
experimental setting of discrete time, random pairwise
matching and local information. This setting has its re-
ality in biology and economics [16, 14, 18, 19, 8, 17, 20,
21, 22, 29, 30]. We collect a total number of twelve ex-
perimental trajectories from our experiments (each tra-
jectory is the result of 300 rounds of the game) and then
analyze these trajectories. Like other previous exper-
iments [17, 19, 21, 22, 31] and theories [32, 33], the
evolutionary trajectories are highly stochastic, but us-
ing our non-equilibrium order parameter we are able to
confirm that cycles exist and do not dissipate. The mean
frequency of cycles is about 0.029±0.009 period per ex-
perimental round. This mean value is used to evaluate
the noise parameter β of the logit dynamics model, and
a value of β ≈ 0.20 is obtained.
This paper is organized as following. In the next sec-
tion we introduce the standard RPS game in the tradi-
tional setting and describe our data analysis protocol.
In section 3 we describe our main experimental results.
The experimental results are compared with the predic-
tions of the discrete-time logit dynamics model in sec-
tion 4. We conclude this work in the last section.
2. Experimental setup and data analysis
There are three different pure strategies in the Rock-
Paper-Scissors game, namely Rock (R), Paper (R) and
Scissors (S ). These three strategies form a directed cir-
cle R → S → P → R, namely R beats S , S beats P,
and P in turn beats R. In our experiments we use the
simple payoff matrix shown in Table 1 to make the RPS
game a constant-sum game: In each play between two
players, the winning player gets a payoff 2 (i.e., two ex-
perimental points) while the losing player gets a payoff
0; if there is a tie then each player gets an equal payoff
1.
R P S
R
P
S
1 0 2
2 1 0
0 2 1
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The value
of each matrix element is the payoff of the row player’s strategy given
the strategy of the column player.
2.1. Experimental setting
There were twelve independent and disjoint groups
in our laboratory experiments. Each group was formed
by six players, therefore the RPS game is a finite pop-
ulation game with population size N = 6. Each group
played the RPS game 300 rounds (we will explain the
motivation to use 300 rounds later on). In each round
of the play, the six players of each group were first
randomly assigned to three disjoint sub-groups by a
computer program, and then the two players of each
sub-group played the RPS game once. All players
made their own decisions simultaneously and anony-
mously. After all the players had submitted their
choices, each player then got the feedback information
through her/his private computer screen. The feedback
information included her/his own strategy, her/his op-
ponent’s strategy, and her/his own payoff. No other
information was provided to the players. Each player
also understood that her/his strategy in each round of
the play is only shown to her/his opponent of this round
but not shown to the other players.
These 12 experimental sessions were conducted dur-
ing December 2010 in the experimental social science
laboratory of Zhejiang University. The 72 experimental
subjects (players) were recruited broadly from the stu-
dent population of the university. They were sitting in
an isolated seat with a computer during the games. Both
written and oral instructions were provided for each
player before the experiment. During the experiment,
the players gained experimental points in each round of
the game according to the payoff matrix. The experi-
mental sessions lasted about 1.5-2 hours. The players
got their earnings in cash privately after the experiment
according to the accumulated experimental points over
the 300 rounds. The exchange rule is one experimental
point equals 0.15 Yuan RMB. In addition, each player
got 5 Yuan RMB as show-up fee. The average earning
was about 50 Yuan RMB.
2.2. Data analysis
There are three pure strategies in the RPS game,
therefore we use a vector (x, y, z) to denote a generic
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social state of the population, with x, y and z being re-
spectively the fraction of players using strategy R, P and
S . Suppose at the t-th round of the game, nR(t) play-
ers used strategy R, nP(t) players used strategy P, and
nS (t) = N − nR(t) − nP(t) players used strategy S . Then
x ≡ nR(t)
N
, y ≡ nP(t)
N
, z ≡ nS (t)
N
) .
Obviously x, y, and z should satisfy x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0,
and x + y + z = 1. The total number of different social
states for a population of size N is simply (N+1)(N+2)2 . In
the studied case of N = 6 this number is 28.
The social state (x, y, z) of a population at a given time
point is a coarse-grained description about the strategies
used by the members of this population [23, 8]. The set
of all the social states of a population is referred to as
the social state space of the population. It can be repre-
sented graphically by an equilateral triangle in a three-
dimensional Euclidian coordinate system, see Fig. 1.
Each social state (x, y, z) corresponds to a point in the
interior or on the boundary of this triangle. The central
point ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) of the triangle is the Nash equilibrium
(NE) point of the RPS game.
Generically speaking, the social state of the popula-
tion is different at different rounds t of the repeated RPS
game. The social state (x, y, z) as a function of the dis-
crete time t forms an evolutionary trajectory in the so-
cial state space [23, 8, 10, 22], see Fig. 2 for a simple
illustration. After an evolution trajectory of T time steps
has been collected, we then perform statistical analysis
on it. The first quantities of interest are the mean values
of x, y and z, namely
x ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
x(t) , y ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
y(t) , z ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
z(t) . (1)
To detect weak but persist directional motion in the
social state space, we follow Ref. [10, 34] and set a line
segment between the Nash equilibrium point and a point
chosen at the boundary of the triangle (see Fig. 1). Such
a line segment is referred to as a Poincare´ section. Con-
sider two consecutive social states ~s(t) ≡
(
x(t), y(t), z(t)
)
and ~s(t + 1) ≡
(
x(t + 1), y(t + 1), z(t + 1)
)
. If either ~s(t)
or ~s(t + 1) is identical to the Nash equilibrium point, or
if the line segment from ~s(t) to ~s(t + 1) does not cross
the Poincare´ section, then the transition ~s(t) → ~s(t + 1)
is assigned a counting number Ct = 0. Otherwise, (1) if
the transition ~s(t) → ~s(t + 1) crosses the Poincare´ sec-
tion from left to right (count-clockwise with respect to
the direction axis ( 1√
3
, 1√
3
, 1√
3
) of the social state plane),
then Ct = +1; (2) if this transition crosses the Poincare´
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Figure 1: Social state space and Poincare´ section of the RPS game
with N = 6 players. Each social state is represented by a point (x, y, z)
on the plane characterized by x + y + z = 1. All the 28 social states
are distributed within or on the boundary of an equilateral triangle.
The social state ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) is the Nash equilibrium (NE) point. To de-
tect possible persistent flow within the social state space, a line seg-
ment linking the Nash equilibrium point and the social state ( 12 , 12 , 0)
is drawn. This line is referred to as the Poincare´ section.
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Figure 2: A pictorial view of a short segment of an experimentally
recorded evolutionary trajectory, starting from t = 185 and ending at
t = 190. The counting numbers of the four social state transitions
are, respectively, C185 = 0.5, C186 = 0.5, C187 = 0, C188 = −1
and C189 = 0. Therefore the accumulated counting number of this
trajectory segment is C185,190 = 0.
section from right to left (clockwise), then Ct = −1; (3)
if ~s(t) is on the Poincare´ section but is different from the
Nash equilibrium point, then Ct = 0.5 (Ct = −0.5) if
~s(t + 1) is to the right (left) of the Poincare´ section; (4)
if ~s(t+1) is on the Poincare´ section but is different from
the Nash equilibrium point, then Ct = 0.5 (Ct = −0.5) if
~s(t) is to the left (right) of the Poincare´ section. We give
some concrete examples of computing Ct in Fig. 2.
The accumulated counting number Ct0,t1 of the evolu-
tionary trajectory during the time interval [t0, t1] is de-
fined as
Ct0,t1 ≡
t1−1∑
t=t0
Ct . (2)
The accumulated counting number Ct0,t1 quantifies the
net number of cycles around the Nash equilibrium point.
Such a quantity can help us to detect deterministic be-
haviors in a stochastic process [34]. Starting from the
initial time t0 = 1, if C1,t scales linearly with t during
the social-state evolution process, then it indicates the
existence of persistent cycles around the Nash equilib-
rium; if C1,t as a curve of t only fluctuates around 0,
then there is no persistent cycles around the Nash equi-
librium. The mean frequency of cyclic motion in the
Table 2: Statistics on the strategies. #R denotes the total number of
times the strategy R being chosen by members of a given population
(#P and #S have similar meanings). x, y, z are defined by Eq. (1).
group #R #P #S x y z
1 675 601 524 0.375 0.334 0.291
2 632 533 635 0.351 0.296 0.353
3 584 591 625 0.324 0.328 0.347
4 688 615 497 0.382 0.342 0.276
5 669 568 563 0.372 0.316 0.313
6 642 578 580 0.357 0.321 0.322
7 606 583 611 0.337 0.324 0.339
8 625 558 617 0.347 0.31 0.343
9 675 581 544 0.375 0.323 0.302
10 604 604 592 0.336 0.336 0.329
11 643 567 590 0.357 0.315 0.328
12 659 558 583 0.366 0.31 0.324
time interval [t0, t1] is defined as
ft0 ,t1 ≡
Ct0 ,t1
t1 − t0
=
1
t1 − t0
t1−1∑
t=t0
Ct . (3)
Starting from the initial time t0 = 1, we are interested in
the value of f1,t as t becomes large.
3. Experimental results
Table 2 lists the total number of times the three strate-
gies have been used in each of the 12 evolutionary tra-
jectories. Among the twelve evolutionary trajectories of
length 300, the total number of times the strategy R, P
and S being used is, respectively, 7702, 6937 and 6961.
The mean value of x, y and z as defined in Eq. (1),
is then x = 0.357 ± 0.005, y = 0.321 ± 0.004 and
z = 0.322 ± 0.007 (the standard deviation is estimated
over the 12 evolution trajectories, see Table 2). The ob-
served mean point (x, y, z) is only slightly different from
the theoretical Nash equilibrium point ( 13 , 13 , 13 ).
The experimental trajectories are highly stochastic,
similar to the observations on other game processes
[17, 19, 21, 29, 22]. However, if we plot the evolution
behavior of the accumulated counting number C1,t with
time t in Fig. 3, we find that C1,t increases with t in most
of the data sets. The value of C1,300 for each of the 12
experimental trajectories is shown in the last column of
Table 3. We obtain that the mean value of C1,300 to be
C1,300 = 8.54±2.66. Accordingly, the mean cycling fre-
quency of these 12 evolutionary trajectories in 300 steps
is f 1,300 = 0.029 ± 0.009. In other words, the empirical
frequency of the cycles is 0.029 ± 0.009 period per ex-
perimental round. The 95% confidence interval of this
frequency is [0.009, 0.048].
Statistical analysis on the 12 sampled values of C1,300
suggests that the null hypothesis H1 that C1,300 = 0 can
4
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Figure 3: Accumulated counting number C1,t as a function of evolu-
tion time t. Each of the twelve curves corresponds to one evolutionary
trajectory involving six players.
be rejected (p < 0.01, t-test). Therefore we can say that
cycles do exist in the RPS game in our experiments. Sta-
tistical analysis also shows that C1,300 > 0 (p < 0.01),
i.e., the cycles are counter-clockwise around the Nash
equilibrium point. This result is consistent with the
theoretical predictions of some evolutionary dynamics
models [8, 1, 7].
According to the last row in Table 3, to confirm
the existence of cycles using 12 samples, the trajectory
length t should be at least 150. This is because the the
null hypothesis (C1,t = 0) can be rejected (p < 0.05)
only when t ≥ 150. That long evolutionary trajectories
are needed to confirm the existence of cycles can also
be understood from the empirical fact that the mean cy-
cling frequency is very small.
To see the persistence of cycles, setting null hypoth-
esis as C1,150 > C151,300 which means the cycles is
disappearing along time. This hypothesis can be re-
jected by experimental data (p = 0.06 < 0.10). Set-
ting C1,100 > C201,300, this null hypothesis can be re-
jected strongly (p < 0.01). Concerning the question
“Do cycles dissipate when subjects must choose simul-
taneously?” raised recently by the authors of Ref. [10],
our experimental data therefore suggest that cycles do
not dissipate.
4. Comparison with a simple model
To theoretically understand the experimental obser-
vations, we now study a noisy best-response process as
Table 3: The accumulated counting number C1,t in the twelve
evolutionary trajectories.
Group C1,50 C1,100 C1,150 C1,200 C1,250 C1,300
1 0.50 3.00 5.50 5.50 8.50 9.00
2 0.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 6.00
3 1.00 1.50 4.50 7.00 10.00 14.00
4 1.50 2.00 3.00 6.50 9.50 11.00
5 -3.00 -4.00 -5.00 -6.00 -4.00 -5.00
6 3.00 4.50 7.00 13.00 18.00 21.00
7 4.00 5.50 12.50 17.00 21.00 25.00
8 1.50 4.50 5.50 6.00 11.00 12.00
9 -3.50 -5.50 -3.50 -4.50 -2.50 -1.00
10 1.50 4.50 6.50 3.50 5.50 5.50
11 -2.00 -5.00 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -4.50
12 -0.50 0.50 2.50 3.50 6.50 9.50
Mean 0.33 1.13 3.25 4.25 7.08 8.54
95%L -1.12 -1.35 0.03 -0.04 2.09 2.68
95%U 1.78 3.60 6.47 8.54 12.07 14.40
p-value 0.62 0.34 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
The last four rows are the statistical results of the 12 experimental
groups above. The row titled as p-value is t-test result by setting the
null hypothesis C1,t = 0 for the 12 samples. 95%U(L) means the upper
(lower) bound of 95% confidence interval over the 12 samples.
a simple model for the RPS game, namely the discrete-
time logit dynamics [35]. Multiple equilibria and limit
cycles in the logit dynamics has also been studied in a
very recent paper by Hommes and Ochea [36] in the
continuous-time limit.
Suppose the population of N players is in the social
state (x, y, z) after the t-th round of the game. Let us
denote by ui the mean payoff of the strategy i ∈ {R, P, S }
for this social state. From the payoff matrix of Table 1
we can easily obtain that
uR = x + 2z , uP = y + 2x , uS = z + 2y . (4)
We assume that at the (t + 1)-round of the game, each
player of the population will choose a strategy from
{S ,R, P} independently of all the other players. And
we further assume that the time-dependent probability
pi for a player to choose strategy i is
pi =
eβui
eβuS + eβuR + eβuP
, ∀i ∈ {R, P, S } . (5)
The parameter β is referred to as the “inverse tempera-
ture” of the logit dynamics, its value quantifies the ra-
tionality degree of human agents in strategy interaction
[35, 37, 38, 20, 39, 40, 7, 41, 42]. In the limiting case
of β = 0 each strategy will be chosen with the uniform
probability 13 .
For this simple Markovian process, the transition
probability T (x,y,z)(x′,y′,z′) from a social state (x, y, z) at time
t to another social state (x′, y′, z′) at time (t + 1) is ex-
pressed as (noticing that z′ = 1 − x′ − y′)
T (x,y,z)(x′ ,y′,z′) =
N!
(Nx′)!(Ny′)!(Nz′)! p
Nx′
R p
Ny′
P p
Nz′
S
5
=
N!
(Nx′)!(Ny′)!(Nz′)! ×
eNβ[xx
′+yy′+zz′+2(xy′+yz′+zx′)]
(eβ(x+2z) + eβ(y+2x) + eβ(z+2y))N . (6)
The steady-state probability W∗(x,y,z) that the system is
in the social state (x, y, z) at t = ∞ can be obtained by
solving the following fixed-point equation
W∗(x,y,z) =
∑
(x′ ,y′,z′)
T (x
′ ,y′,z′)
(x,y,z) W
∗
(x′ ,y′,z′) . (7)
Because the transition probability from any social state
(x, y, z) to any another social state (x′, y′, z′) is positive,
Eq. (7) has a unique solution with the normalization
property
∑
(x,y,z) W∗(x,y,z) = 1 [43]. It is not difficult to
prove that the steady-state probability distribution has
the following rotational symmetry
W∗x,y,z = W∗y,z,x = W∗z,x,y . (8)
This rotational symmetry ensures that
∑
(x,y,z)
xW∗(x,y,z) =
∑
(x,y,z)
yW∗(x,y,z) =
∑
(x,y,z)
zW∗(x,y,z) =
1
3 , (9)
namely the logit dynamics will reach the Nash equilib-
rium ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) at t → ∞.
It can be checked numerically and analytically that,
for any β > 0, the detailed balance condition is violated
at the steady-state of the logit dynamics. For two dif-
ferent social states (x, y, z) and (x′, y′, z′), in general we
will find that
T (x,y,z)(x′,y′,z′)W
∗
(x,y,z) , T
(x′,y′,z′)
(x,y,z) W
∗
(x′ ,y′,z′) .
Because of the violation of detailed balance, directional
flows may persist in the system even at t → ∞.
We are especially interested in the directional flow
around the Nash equilibrium point. Consider two so-
cial states (x, y, z) and (x′, y′, z′) on the evolutionary tra-
jectory at two consecutive time points t and t + 1. If
either (x, y, z) or (x′, y′, z′) is identical to the Nash equi-
librium point, the transition (x, y, z) → (x′, y′, z′) is not
a rotational motion around the Nash equilibrium, and
we set the corresponding rotational angle θ(x,y,z)(x′ ,y′,z′) to be
zero. The Nash equilibrium point may be sitting on
the rectilinear line that passing through the social states
(x, y, z) and (x′, x′, z′). If this is the case, the transi-
tion (x, y, z) → (x′, y′, z′) is also not a rotational motion
around the Nash equilibrium, and its rotational angle
θ
(x,y,z)
(x′ ,y′,z′) is again set to be zero. In all the remaining cases,
the social states (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) and the Nash equilib-
rium point form a triangle in the social state plane of
Fig. 1. The magnitude of the rotational angle θ(x,y,z)(x′ ,y′,z′) is
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Figure 4: The steady-state mean cycling frequency f ∗ of the discrete-
time logit dynamical process with population size N = 6. The solid
line is theoretical result obtained with Eq. (10); the cross (×) symbols
with error bars are obtained by averaging over many simulated evolu-
tionary trajectories of length 300. The mean experimental frequency
of f 1,300 ≈ 0.029 and its 95% confidence upper and lower bound are
marked by the dashed lines.
just the angle of this triangle at vertex point ( 13 , 13 , 13 ), it
must be less than π. The rotational angle θ(x,y,z)(x′ ,y′,z′) is de-
fined as positive if the rotation from (x, y, z) to (x′, y′, z′)
with respect to the Nash equilibrium point is counter-
clockwise, otherwise it is defined as negative.
At the steady-state of the discrete-time logit dynam-
ics, the mean frequency f ∗ that the evolution trajectory
rotates around the Nash equilibrium point can then be
computed by the following formula
f ∗ ≡ 12π
∑
(x,y,z)
W∗(x,y,z)
∑
(x′ ,y′,z′)
T (x,y,z)(x′,y′,z′)θ
(x,y,z)
(x′ ,y′,z′) . (10)
For the population size N = 6, we show in Fig. 4 the
steady-state mean frequency f ∗ as a function of the in-
verse temperature β. To check the correctness of the the-
oretical calculations, we also perform computer simula-
tions based on the discrete-time logit dynamics model
to generate a set of simulated evolutionary trajectories
of length 300. The mean cycling frequencies of these
simulated evolutionary trajectories are also shown in
Fig. 4. The agreement between analytical calculations
and computer simulation results are very good. We find
that f ∗ increases almost linearly with the inverse tem-
perature β when β < 1.5. Comparing the theoretical
results with the mean frequency value of f 1,300 = 0.029,
we infer the inverse parameter should be set to β = 0.20.
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Figure 5: Probability of staying in the social state (x, y, z) for a pop-
ulation of size N = 6. The horizontal axis is the predicted probability
by the discrete-time logit dynamics model with inverse temperature
β = 0.20, while the vertical axis is the empirical probability measured
from the 12 experimental trajectories. Because of the rotational sym-
metry (8), the 28 social states can be coarse-grained into ten groups:
(1), {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)}; (2), {(0, 16 , 56 ), ( 16 , 56 , 0), ( 56 , 0, 16 )}; (3),
{(0, 13 , 23 ), ( 13 , 23 , 0), 23 , 0, 13 )}; (4), {(0, 12 , 12 ), ( 12 , 12 , 0), ( 12 , 0, 12 )}; (5),
{( 16 , 0, 56 ), ( 56 , 16 , 0), (0, 56 , 16 )}; (6), {( 16 , 16 , 23 ), ( 16 , 23 , 16 ), ( 23 , 16 , 16 )}; (7),
{( 16 , 13 , 12 ), ( 13 , 12 , 16 ), ( 12 , 16 , 13 )}; (8), {( 13 , 0, 23 ), ( 23 , 13 , 0), (0, 23 , 13 )}; (9),
{( 13 , 16 , 12 ), ( 12 , 13 , 16 ), ( 16 , 12 , 13 )}; (10), {( 13 , 13 , 13 )}. All the social states
of a given group have the same stationary probability (the same
horizontal-axis value) according to the theoretical model, but their
measured probabilities might be different (the mean vertical-axis
value and the standard error).
At β = 0.20, we also perform computer simula-
tions based on the discrete-time logic dynamics model
to generate a set of independent evolution trajectories of
length T = 300. We then perform the same analysis on
these trajectories and find that the direction of the cycles
is counter-clockwise and the mean cycling frequency is
f ≈ 0.029, consistent with the experimental result.
At β = 0.20, the steady-state probability W∗(x,y,z) of
visiting each social state (x, y, z) as predicted by the logit
dynamics is compared with the empirically observed
probability of visiting (x, y, z), see Fig. 5. The agree-
ment between theory and experiment is again very good.
Although the discrete-time noisy-response logit dy-
namic model can describe our experimental observa-
tions excellently, we should point out an important dif-
ference between the model assumption and the experi-
mental setting. In our experiments, after each round of
the game, each player only knows the strategy of her/his
opponent but not the social state of the whole popula-
tion. However in the logit dynamics model, we assume
that each player choose a strategy based on the knowl-
edge of the current social state of the population, see
Eq. (5). In this sense, the logit dynamics model is still
a phenomenological model. It is of interest to quanti-
tatively describe the RPS evolutionary dynamics by a
more microscopic model. We hope to return to this is-
sue in a future study.
5. Conclusion and discussions
As a brief summary, in this work we studied the
Rock-Paper-Scissors game both experimentally and an-
alytically. Our experimental data gave strong evidence
that counter-clockwise cycles around the Nash equilib-
rium point exist in the social-state evolutionary trajec-
tory of a finte population. We demonstrated that our
experimental observations can be quantitatively under-
stood by a simple theoretical model of noisy-response
logit dynamics.
RPS game experiments on EGT were also reported
quite recently by Cason and co-authors and by Hoffman
and co-authors [10, 8]. The backgrounds and cutting
edges of the experiment research are well documented
in these two references [10, 8]. Compared with the de-
centralized setting of our present work, the experimen-
tal environments of the RPS game in these two recent
works [10, 8] are all centralized: Instead of pairwise
meetings, in all of the experiments reported in [10, 8],
each subject competes against the choices of all other
subjects. However, the decentralized setting (especially
the random matching pairwise setting) is more closer
to the natural environments in biology and economics
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(e.g., [16, 14]). For example, the encounters of male
lizards are pairwise meetings [11]. For decentralized
population RPS games, according to our knowledge, the
existence of persistent cyclic motions was not confirmed
by any previous laboratory experiments.
Going back to traditional (decentralized) setting ex-
periments of the simplest RPS game, the present work
added strong evidence in favor of the existence of per-
sistent cycles. As a fundamental observation on cycle,
the mean frequency of cycles was quantitatively meas-
sured. There are tens of dynamics models which have
been build to interpret cyclic behavior in RPS game,
however there are rare quantitative observations from
real experiments. Quantitative measurements from ex-
periments is important, without which to evaluate a dy-
namics equation precisely is almost impossible (or plau-
sible). As demonstrated, our experimental observations
can be quantitatively understood by a simple theoretical
model of noisy-response logit dynamics.
We wish to emphasize two major points of our exper-
imental approach. First, by recording sufficiently long
evolutionary trajectories, we were able to detect weak
deterministic motion in a highly stochastic process. We
noticed that cycles can only be confirmed (p < 0.05)
when the trajectories are longer than 150 rounds in
twelve samples. Second, we focus on time asymmetry
of social state transitions. Importance of time asymme-
try has been well emphasised in non-equilibrium statis-
tical physics [34, 25, 44]. The frequency is observed
from the loops out of detailed balance.
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